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Abstract
This paper explores the joint determination of home bias and attention allocation. We
overcome the typical challenge associated with evaluating attention allocation theories by
using a new internet search query dataset to measure how much information investors de-
cide to process. Employing an instrumental variables approach, we ￿nd empirical evidence
of a two-way causality between home bias and attention. Our estimates suggest that if all
countries were to receive the same level of attention as the U.S., then the average home
bias by U.S. investors would fall from 85.2% to 57.3%.
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The existence of a domestic bias in international equity holdings was ￿rst documented by
French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995). One popular justi￿cation focuses on
the role of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors. Although over
the past decade innovations in telecommunication and information technologies have greatly
increased investors￿access to information around the globe, signi￿cant levels of home bias still
remain. To explain this persistent bias, information-based models commonly have to assume
implausibly large exogenous information asymmetries. Recent work by Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009), however, generated these large information asymmetries by endogeneizing
the investors￿information structure. In their model, the allocation of investors￿limited atten-
tion leads to information heterogeneity endogenously and thereby a sizeable bias in portfolios.
Our paper provides empirical support for attention-based explanations of the home equity
bias.
The idea that ￿most people everyday encounter, or could very easily encounter, much
more information that is in principle relevant to their economic behavior than they actually
respond to￿(Sims, 2006) ￿ known as inattentiveness ￿ has recently been incorporated into
￿nance and economic models.1 Although attention allocation models are very appealing from
a theoretical perspective, empirical evaluation remains a challenge. The main di¢ culty relies
on measuring the pieces of information each agent processes. Our paper overcomes such a
challenge by using a new dataset from America Online (henceforth AOL) that includes over
21 million web searches by 657,426 customers. We then combine data on U.S. holdings of
foreign securities to analyze the joint determination of home bias and attention allocation by
U.S. investors.
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we derive a simple model based on Van Nieuwer-
1In macroeconomics, inattentiveness has been used by Mackoviak and Wiederholt (2009a) and Mankiw
and Reis (2002) to explain sticky prices and by Luo (2008), Mackoviak and Wiederholt (2009b) and Tutino
(2009) to explain business cycle dynamics. Falkinger (2007) develops a theoretical model in which ￿rms have
to compete ￿rst for consumers￿attention before competing for their budgets. In ￿nance, it has been used to
better understand the equity-premium puzzle in Gabaix and Laibson (2002), price comovement in Mondria
(2010), portfolio under-diversi￿cation in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), home equity bias in Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) and the forward discount bias in Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2009).
1burgh and Veldkamp (2009) to study the channels through which attention allocation a⁄ects
portfolio choice and vice versa. Second, we provide a new measure of the attention allo-
cated across countries by U.S. investors. Measuring attention allocation is a complicated task.
Agents process information using di⁄erent media (i.e., books, magazines, newspapers, radio,
TV, the Internet) and, for most of these media, it is virtually impossible to track the amount
of e⁄ort spent processing information about di⁄erent topics. On August 3, 2006, AOL released
a dataset that includes all web search queries from its users for a three month period (March
1st to May 31st of 2006), as well as whether they clicked on a result and where it appeared
on the result page. A web search query is the exact phrase that a user types into the search
engine to satisfy his or her information needs. In this paper, we explore the AOL dataset
to help us measure the attention allocated to di⁄erent countries. We believe that a measure
based on internet search queries can proxy attention allocation because: (i) the World Wide
Web is becoming the predominant information medium; (ii) search engines are the most pop-
ular tool for ￿nding reliable information on the ￿Web￿since they minimize the time required
and the amount of information which must be consulted; (iii) by having user￿ s exact search
query, we know the topic that he or she was interested in. Using this dataset, we construct a
click-through series that counts the number of times a user clicked on a search result from a
particular country. The idea is to measure the attention allocated to a country by the number
of times this country provided the answer to a search query.
Our third contribution is to study the determinants of attention allocation and home
equity bias across countries by U.S. investors. We combine the click-through series with home
bias data constructed from the 2006 survey of U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities. We
recognize that both home bias and attention allocation are endogenous and, using instrumental
variables as our estimation methodology, we ￿nd empirical evidence of joint causality. First,
causality runs from asset holdings to attention allocation. Using instrumental variables that
capture implicit ￿nancial costs, we ￿nd that agents do indeed allocate more attention to
countries whose assets make up a greater share of their portfolios. Second, causality also
runs from attention allocation to asset holdings. Using instrumental variables that are related
2to a country￿ s popularity among internet users, we ￿nd that international investors favor
assets from more familiar countries. Taken together, our results show that the unconditional
correlation between measures of information and equity holdings is not just due to agents being
more interested in countries whose assets they already hold. Instead, agents endogenously
increase their holdings of a particular country￿ s assets in response to an exogenous increase in
the information they have about that country. Our results also suggest that if all countries
were to receive the same level of attention as the U.S., then the average home bias by U.S.
investors would fall from 85.2% to 57.3%.
Many studies have emphasized the importance of asymmetric information in determining
home bias.2 Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004), for example, provide evidence that in-
formation regarding accounting standards and practices is an important determinant of the
distribution of home bias across countries. Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003)
discuss the importance of information about cross-country di⁄erences in corporate governance
while Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2005) suggest that information regarding sov-
ereign risks and political events helps explain di⁄erences in country portfolios. Bekaert (1995)
presents evidence that information about macroeconomic conditions, market structure and
institutions are important drivers of equity ￿ ows into emerging markets and Portes and Rey
(2005) and Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) ￿nd that the geography of information is relevant for
explaining cross-border equity ￿ ows and mutual fund equity holdings respectively. Moreover,
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Malloy (2005) show that fund managers are able to predict
abnormal returns in local investments. Because these results are stronger for investments in
small ￿rms and ￿rms located in remote areas, the authors argue that local investments allow
fund managers to assess and survey the ￿rm￿ s operations and have regular meetings with
CEOs. This evidence indicates that information about ￿rm operations and close contact with
CEOs generates local bias at home.3
2For theoretical work on the home equity bias puzzle and asymmetric information, see Gehrig (1993),
Brennan and Cao (1997), Zhou (1998), Barron and Ni (2008), Hatchondo (2008) and Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009).
3However, the evidence provided by Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), who show
that foreign investors hold stock of ￿rms that are large and have low leverage, suggests that the e⁄ect of this
information on investments across the border might be rather small.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
describes the new measure of attention allocation. Section 4 presents the dataset. Section
5 describes the empirical methodology. Section 6 shows the empirical results. Section 7
concludes.
2 Model
The objective of the model is to understand how attention allocation a⁄ects asset holdings
and how asset holdings a⁄ect attention allocation.
2.1 Model Description
We formulate a partial equilibrium model based on Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009,
2010) with a continuum of investors and two countries.4 The economy consists of a risk free
asset, which pays R units of the consumption good, and two independent risky assets. Even
though this is a static model, four discrete events occur during the operation of the market.
First, traders are endowed with an initial wealth Wi0 and limited information processing
resources ￿: Second, investors allocate their limited information processing resources to analyze
both stock markets and, based on this allocation, obtain private information about each
market, ~ Yi = (~ yi;1; ~ yi;2)0. Third, each investor chooses optimal asset holdings Xi = (xi;1;xi;2)0
given ~ Yi. Fourth, trading ceases and investors consume the payo⁄s realized by their portfolios.
Investors have an absolute risk tolerance parameter ￿ and maximize a mean-variance ob-
jective function
Ui = E
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subject to the following budget constraint
Wi1 = Wi0 + X0
i( ~ R ￿ RP)
4For a full general equilibrium model, where attention allocation and asset holdings are jointly determined,
see Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) and Mondria and Wu (2010).
4where Wi0 is the initial wealth of agent i, Xi = (xi;1;xi;2)0 is the asset holdings vector of
agent i, ~ R = (~ r1; ~ r2)0 with ~ rj ￿ N
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for j = 1;2 is the vector of risky asset payo⁄s,
~ Yi = (~ yi;1; ~ yi;2)0 is agent i0s private information about each market and ~ P is the price vector
of the risky assets.
Investors devote information capacity to process information about the vector of unknown
and independent asset payo⁄s ~ R. Agent i receives a private signal about each risky asset
j = 1;2 given by
~ yi;j = ~ rj + ~ "i;j where "i;j ￿ N(0;￿2
i;j)
Investors want to obtain information about the risky assets in order to reduce the uncertainty
of their optimal portfolio. They face the following linear technology for processing information
about the state of the economy5
1
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i;j
=
￿i;j
￿2
r;j
where ￿i;j is the attention allocated by agent i to stock market j. In other words, the precision
of a private signal is higher if more attention is allocated to that particular signal. However,
investors are constrained in their capacity to process information about asset payo⁄s:
￿i;1 + ￿i;2 ￿ ￿ and ￿i;j ￿ 0 for j = 1;2
The information constraint imposes a limit on the reduction of agent i￿ s uncertainty about
the future payo⁄ of risky asset j so the information processing resources have to be optimally
divided between the two risky assets. After deciding how much information to process about
each stock market, investors use Bayesian updating to incorporate the private signal, ~ Yi, into
their beliefs about asset payo⁄s and, based on these posterior beliefs, they then choose their
optimal asset holdings.
5Peng and Xiong (2006) assume an increasing returns to scale technology to process information, which
implies ￿
2
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￿ij ￿1). However, as in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), we assume a linear technology
that implies constant returns to scale.
52.2 E⁄ect of Attention Allocation on Asset Holdings
Suppose each agent chooses risky asset holdings taking the attention allocation as given. After
observing a private signal about each risky asset, investors derive posterior beliefs about asset
payo⁄s in order to determine their optimal holdings
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Therefore, investors hold more assets from countries where they allocate more attention.
2.3 E⁄ect of Asset Holdings on Attention Allocation
Suppose that investors take as given their asset holdings when choosing where to allocate
information resources. The objective function is then
min
￿i;1;￿i;2
X0
iV
￿
~ R j ~ Yi
￿
Xi
which can be rewritten as
minx2
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￿
subject to the information processing constraint
￿i;1 + ￿i;2 ￿ ￿ and ￿i;j ￿ 0
6The optimal attention allocation is given by
￿i;1 =
8
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￿ if xi1￿r1 ￿ (1 + ￿)xi2￿r2
0 if xi2￿r2 ￿ (1 + ￿)xi1￿r1
xi1￿r1(1+￿)￿xi2￿r2
xi1￿r1+xi2￿r2 otherwise
and
￿i;2 = ￿ ￿ ￿i;1
The attention allocated to a particular stock market increases with the asset holdings from
that market since
@￿i;j
@xi;j
￿ 0 (2)
Therefore, investors optimally decide to allocate more attention to countries where they have
more asset holdings.
3 Measuring Attention Allocation
The model presented in the previous section developed a relationship between attention al-
location and asset holdings. In order to test the predictions of the model, we need to ￿nd
an appropriate measure of the attention allocated to di⁄erent countries by economic agents.
However, this is not an easy task. First, agents process information using various media (i.e.,
books, magazines, newspapers, radio, TV, the Internet). Second, for most of these media, it is
virtually impossible to track the amount of e⁄ort each agent spends on processing information
about individual countries. In this section, we show how data from Internet search queries
help us overcome these di¢ culties.
3.1 The World Wide Web and Internet search engines
The World Wide Web (commonly shortened to ￿the Web￿ ) is becoming a predominant infor-
mation system. The Web is a system of interlinked hypertext documents accessible via the
7Internet. With a web browser, a user may access information contained in these documents by
viewing web pages and exploring their texts, images, videos, and other multimedia. However,
the exponential growth in the number of documents available, one of the main reasons for its
increasing popularity, also creates a problem referred to as information overload. The high
rate of new documents being added to the already available and large stock, combined with
a signi￿cant proportion of websites with questionable reliability, make it very di¢ cult for the
user to identify relevant information. For this reason, Internet search engine tools are very
popular. Search engines help minimize the time required to locate reliable information and
the amount of information that is consulted.
Some numbers con￿rm this increasing popularity. According to the World Development
Indicators database, the number of Internet users in the U.S. as a fraction of the total popu-
lation increased from 43.9% in 2000 to 63.0% in 2004. Moreover, according to Fallows (2005),
84% of adult Internet users have used search engines to help them ￿nd information on the
Web.6 On an average day, about 53% of internet users go online and more than half of them
will use a search engine. As the author concludes, ￿searching is becoming a daily habit for
about a third of all internet users.￿
In addition to the popularity of search engines, Fallows (2005) also ￿nds that search engine
users are con￿dent about their searching abilities, have positive experiences when using search
engines and trust the search results they obtain. These conclusions were reached after analyzing
a daily tracking survey of the Internet use of 2,200 American adults, aged 18 and older, over
the period May 14 - June 17, 2004.
3.2 The AOL click-through series
The previous section established that the Internet, with the help of search engine tools, is one
of the most popular ways of ￿nding information. However, we are still left with the problem
of measuring the attention allocated to each individual country.
Recently, AOL released the search/click-through histories of 657,426 anonymous users over
6Among all Internet activities, only the act of sending and receiving email is more popular than using search
engines.
8a three month period (01 March, 2006 - 31 May, 2006) for research purposes (Pass et al, 2006).
This dataset consists of 36,389,567 records, including 19,442,629 user click-through records and
16,946,938 records without user click-through information. Examples of the records are shown
below:
142 rentdirect.com 2006-03-01 07:17:12
142 www.prescriptionfortime.com 2006-03-12 12:31:06
142 staple.com 2006-03-17 21:19:29
142 westchester.gov 2006-03-20 03:55:57 1 http://www.westchestergov.com
1337 ￿serv 2006-03-24 14:05:01 1 http://www.￿serv.com
1337 ￿serv 2006-03-24 14:05:01 3 http://www.￿servlendingsolutions.com
1337 ￿serv 2006-03-24 14:05:01 2 http://www.￿servinsurance.com
1337 ￿serv 2006-03-24 14:05:01 3 http://www.￿servlendingsolutions.com
1337 integrated real estate 2006-03-27 14:52:29 1 http://www.integratedreal.com
1337 integrated real estate 2006-03-27 14:52:29 2 http://www.irisnet.net
A click-through record is registered when a user clicks on a result from the list returned
by the search engine for his or her query. Each record contains ￿ve pieces of information
(u;q;t;r;c): an anonymous user ID (u), the query issued by the user (q), the time when the
query was submitted for search (t), the rank of the clicked result on the search result page
(r), and the domain portion of the clicked result￿ s URL (c). If a user clicks several results for
a single query, each click is recorded separately.
A record without a user click-through corresponds to an event where a user issued a query,
but did not click on any results returned by the search engine. In this case, the record is a
triplet (u;q;t) consisting of the anonymous user ID, the query issued by the user, and the
time when the query was submitted for search.
The AOL search/click-through data helps us measure the attention allocated to di⁄erent
countries through the Internet not only because it contains the search query, but also because
it tells us whether the user clicked on any of the returned results and, if so, the domain of
the clicked URL. While having the exact search query helps us see the information the user
9was after, many search queries tend to be short and ambiguous so not all search results are
relevant to the user. However, by knowing whether the user clicked through any of the results,
we can identify the relevant ones. Moreover, by having the web address of the results that
were clicked through, we can extract additional information about the user￿ s exact needs.
4 Data
In this section, we present the variables used in our empirical analysis. We construct a quan-
titative measure of attention allocation from the AOL click-through series. We also describe
how we combine data on U.S. holdings of foreign equities with data on market capitalization
to calculate home bias. Finally, we describe additional variables that we use as instruments
and controls. All data refers to the year 2006, unless otherwise noted.
4.1 Attention Allocation
Using the AOL search/click-through data, we construct an attention variable, which measures
the number of times a user clicked through a search result from a particular country between
March 1 and May 31 of 2006. In other words, we are measuring the attention allocated to
a country by the number of times that country provided the answer to a search query. This
measure is constructed by taking the host name from each click-through record and mapping it
to the country where the host address has been assigned. This procedure ￿rst involves ￿nding
the IP address associated with the domain portion of the website name (i.e, DNS lookup).
Since IP addresses are allocated by regional organizations, it is then relatively simple to ￿nd
the country associated with the IP address. Table 1 lists the attention level each country in
our sample receives from AOL users. We can see that the Top 5 countries are United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, Netherlands and Australia.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Di⁄erent types of investors possess di⁄erent information sets, as each requires distinct
information to evaluate ￿nancial assets. We believe the related existing literature has cap-
10tured information gathering by fund managers. Institutional investors are mostly in￿ uenced
by information regarding fundamentals and institutions in a broad sense. Our web search
query data represents the information processing of individual investors and the cross-country
networks associated with migration and cultural ties. The attention allocated by individual
investors across countries does not only a⁄ect their investment strategies, but also institutional
investors￿strategies. As argued by Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005), fund managers￿investment
strategies are directly in￿ uenced by the information and the preferences of their clients, who
primarily are individual investors.
4.2 Home Bias
We combine market capitalization data from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indica-
tors database with cross-border portfolio holdings data from the U.S. Treasury International
Capital System to calculate a measure of U.S. investors￿home bias towards countries in our
sample. Following Ahearne et al (2004) methodology, we calculate each country￿ s share in the
U.S. equity portfolio, and then we normalize the value by the country￿ s share in the world
portfolio. The resulting variable measures the degree in which the amount of U.S. equity
holdings in each country deviates from those predicted by ICAPM. We can see in Table 1 that
the ￿ve countries towards which U.S. investors have the least home bias are Ireland, Mexico,
Switzerland, Finland, and Netherlands.
4.3 Instrumental Variables
We will use three instruments for attention allocation. Our ￿rst instrument is an indicator
of cultural sites within a country. We use the number of World Heritage cultural sites from
the UNESCO/World Heritage Centre list. Our second instrument is a female models ranking
among adult males in the U.S.. We construct this ranking using three portals regarding men￿ s
lifestyle: AskMen, Maxim and FHM. These portals have a target audience of 15-34 years old
men. Each of them compute an annual list of the 100 most beautiful models according to
the preferences of its readers. Using the 2006 rankings, we assign 101 ￿ #rankj points to
11each female model where #rankj is her position in the ranking of magazine j (i.e. 100 points
to the ￿rst place, 99 to the runner up, 98 to the third place and so on). Then we map each
female model to her country of citizenship. Finally, we compute the total number of points
for each country based on the models￿nationality. The higher a country￿ s number of points,
the more popular are its female models and hence the more Internet searches should the
country receive. Table 1 also shows that the ￿ve countries with the highest number of points
awarded to its female models are Canada, United Kingdom, Brazil, South Africa, and Czech
Republic. Our third instrument for attention allocation is the number of Internet users (per
100) obtained from the Telecommunication Union World Telecommunication Development
Report and Database. We will discuss the validity of these instruments in the following section.
We will use two instruments for home bias. Our ￿rst instrument is a qualitative measure
of each country￿ s ￿nancial market sophistication level. The data is collected from the World
Economic Forum￿ s annual Global Competitiveness Report and ranges from 1 (poor by inter-
national standards) to 7 (excellent by international standards). Our second instrument is the
number of procedures required to enforce a contract in each country, collected from the World
Bank￿ s World Development Indicators database. The higher the number of procedures in a
given country, the lower the quality of the regulatory framework. We will discuss the validity
of the above instruments in the following section.
4.4 Additional Controls
We also include additional control variables that may potentially a⁄ect attention or home bias.
First we consider two measures of country size: total population and total land area in square
kilometers. It is natural to expect a larger country to receive more attention; however, it is
unclear whether U.S. investors have a smaller home bias towards larger countries. Since the
home bias variable measures the deviation of actual U.S. holdings relative to those predicted
by ICAPM, it already incorporates the country size.
Following, we look at measures of economic development. Since more developed economies
tend to provide better services, they may receive more attention and less home bias from U.S.
12investors. Our ￿rst proxy for development level is GDP per capita. Our second proxy is a
dummy variable that equals 1 for all countries that were included in the International Monetary
Fund￿ s list of advanced economies in the September 2006 World Economic Outlook.7
We also include in our dataset a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country shares a common
language with the U.S. (i.e., English) and another variable, distance, which measures the
geographical distance (in miles) between a country￿ s capital and Washington DC. Portes and
Rey (2005) ￿nd in gravity equations that distance serves as an adequate proxy for information.
Hence, we could potentially expect distance to be positively related to home bias. Moreover,
common language and distance may a⁄ect attention since it proxies for cultural di⁄erences
between the U.S. and other countries in our sample. The e⁄ect of cultural di⁄erences could
potentially be either positive or negative. A positive e⁄ect suggests that agents use search
engines to learn about more distant cultures, whereas a negative e⁄ect reveals that Americans
are more interested in similar cultures.
Finally, Bohn and Tesar (1996) provide empirical evidence of U.S. investors￿return chasing
behavior. American investors tend to move into foreign markets where returns are expected
to be high. The authors predict excess returns by regressing actual excess returns on lagged
prediction variables. We include in our dataset one of the prediction variables: the lagged
stock market return for each country in U.S. dollars. We collect daily data of the main local
stock index and exchange rates from Bloomberg News Service and calculate the accumulated
stock market return in 2005, the year prior to our home bias data.
Table 2 illustrates the summary statistics, and Table 3 provides the correlation matrix of
the variables described in this section.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
7The list consists of 29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United
Kingdom, United States. Note that Cyprus, Luxembourg, Taiwan Province of China and the United States
are not included in our sample.
135 Methodology
We use an instrumental variable approach to disentangle the e⁄ects of attention allocation on
home bias and vice versa. Speci￿cally, we estimate a system of two cross-sectional equations
using home bias and attention as the endogenous variables:
home biasi = a0 + a1 attentioni + a2 market sophisticationi + a3 enforce a contracti + "hb
i
attentioni = b0 + b1 home biasi + b2 cultural sitesi + b3 female modelsi + b4 internet usersi + "att
i
We use three instruments for attention allocation in the home bias equation. Internet
users look for di⁄erent pieces of information when using search tools. We focus on those that
are unrelated to ￿nancial investments and use sensible proxies for them. A number of studies
in computer science are dedicated to the topical classi￿cation of Internet user search queries.8
Associating an often ambiguous and short search query to the right topic is challenging, yet
essential for e⁄ectiveness and e¢ ciency of Internet search engines. Pass et al (2006) provide a
topical breakdown of search queries from the AOL web search service into 17 speci￿c categories
plus one additional residual group (￿Other￿ ). This categorization of Internet user search
topics provides an excellent starting point. We eliminate four out of 17 categories which are
potentially related to asset holdings (￿Research￿ , ￿Business￿ , ￿News￿ , and ￿Finance￿ ) and
examine the remainder for potential instruments. We focus on two of the Top 5 most popular
search query topics, ￿Places￿and ￿Porn￿ , which rank ￿fth and third, respectively.
Our ￿rst candidate for an instrumental variable is an indicator of a country￿ s popularity
in search queries for ￿Places￿ : the number of World Heritage cultural sites. The Temple
of Angkor Wat, the Taj Mahal, and the Pyramid Fields from Giza to Dahshur all attract
attention to Cambodia, India, and Egypt, respectively, not because they are associated with
￿nancial investment opportunities, but due to their outstanding cultural value to humanity.
Hence, it is natural to expect that the more cultural sites within a country the more attention
8See Beitzel, Jensen, Frieder, Grossman, Lewis, Chowdhury and Kolcz (2005a), Beitzel, Jensen, Frieder,
Lewis, Chowdhury and Kolcz (2005b), He, Yan, Ma and Chen (2007), Joachims (2002), and Lewandowski
(2006).
14the country will attract.
The second candidate is related to ￿Porn￿ : a ranking based on how popular a country￿ s
female models are amongst American citizens. The more popular a country￿ s female models,
the more attention the country will receive. Although this argument is sensible, we must con-
sider the possibility of reverse causality. If a given country is more recognizable to Americans
than others, its female models may be in demand and thus more likely to become famous
world-wide. In this alternative case, the popularity of female models in a speci￿c country
would merely be a re￿ ection of the extra attention the country receives because of familiarity
e⁄ects generated by past common history.9 In other words, stronger cultural proximity may
be the main factor behind American society￿ s demand for a country￿ s cuisine, music, movies,
art, models, consumer products and ￿nancial investments. If this alternative story is true,
the inclusion of explanatory variables such as common language or geographical distance ￿
the usual proxy for cultural proximity used in gravity models ￿in our regressions would have
two important e⁄ects: i) female models would have no signi￿cance in explaining attention
allocation, and ii) attention allocation would have no signi￿cance in explaining home bias.
However, as we will show in our robustness checks, this is not the case. Empirical evidence
does not seem to support this alternative story.
For our third potential instrument, we move away from search query topics and towards
online content creation. Internet users create content online when they post their thoughts,
photos, videos, music, or artwork on a personal Web site, Web blog or Web diary. It is
natural to expect that countries with a larger share of Internet users engaged in content
creation would receive more attention. Unfortunately, there is no data available on content
creation intensity by country, which forces us to rely on a proxy. According to Lenhart et
al (2004), approximately half of the adult American Internet users have contributed material
to the online world. If we assume that this is also the case for other countries, then the
share of Internet users within a country￿ s population could proxy for online content creation
intensity. Hence, we use the number of Internet users (per 100) as our third candidate for an
9Mondria and Wu (2010) show that familiarity of domestic agents with foreign countries, proxied by the
number of international departures from the home country for any purpose other than a remunerated activity
in the country visited, is an important determinant of home bias.
15instrumental variable.
With regards to the instruments for home bias, it is natural to expect investors to shy
away from markets with higher implicit costs, whether they are generated by lack of ￿nancial
sophistication or low quality ￿nancial regulation. Moreover, there is no particular reason to
expect implicit ￿nancial costs to a⁄ect attention through channels other than asset holdings.
Therefore, we consider measures of implicit ￿nancial costs as instrumental variables candidates
for home bias in the attention equation. The ￿rst candidate is a qualitative measure of each
country￿ s ￿nancial market sophistication level. The second candidate is the number of proce-
dures required to enforce a contract in each country. The higher the number of procedures in
a given country, the lower the quality of the regulatory framework.
6 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence for the two-way causality between home bias
and attention allocation. First, we estimate our baseline model using two di⁄erent estima-
tion procedures: equation-by-equation 2SLS and simultaneous equation 3SLS.10 Then, we run
robustness checks by either considering di⁄erent subsamples or by testing the signi￿cance of
additional variables that control for size, economic development, gravity, and return chasing.
6.1 Baseline Model
Our full sample baseline model estimation results are shown in Table 4. The table presents two
pairs of equations, each estimated with a di⁄erent methodology. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) were
individually estimated by 2SLS,11 while the system of equations (4.3) was jointly estimated
by 3SLS. The most noteworthy feature of our results is that regardless of the estimation
procedure, there is evidence of a signi￿cant two-way causality between attention and home
bias as predicted by our model. Moreover, all models have a good in-sample ￿t. The 2SLS
procedure yields an R2 of 65.9% for the attention equation and 48.2% for the home bias
10There is a trade-o⁄ between both methods. While the 3SLS estimator is more e¢ cient, the 2SLS estimator
is more robust. The former procedure requires the system to be perfectly speci￿ed. A wrong instrument in one
equation will bias the coe¢ cients of other equations from the system.
11See Appendix for the 2SLS ￿rst stage regression estimation outputs.
16equation. The 3SLS methodology produces slightly smaller R2￿ s, of 60.2% for attention and
47.5% for home bias.12
[Insert Table 4 about here]
All estimated coe¢ cients in the attention equations are signi￿cant at the 1% level. The
number of procedures required to enforce a contract and the level of ￿nancial market sophis-
tication are used as instruments for home bias. The results reveal that agents do allocate
more attention to countries in which home bias is smaller: a one percentage point decrease in
the U.S. home bias towards a particular country is associated with either a 9.98% or 11.22%
increase in the number of that country￿ s click-throughs if estimated by 2SLS or 3SLS, respec-
tively.13 We can also see that attention is a⁄ected by the number of World Heritage cultural
sites, the popularity of a country￿ s female models, and the number of internet users in a given
country. A 1% increase in cultural sites increases attention by either 0.44% or 0.55%, a 1%
increase in female models increases attention by either 0.25% or 0.20%, and a 1% increase in
internet users increases attention by 0.62% or 0.47%. All of the previous results depend on
whether the coe¢ cient is estimated by 2SLS or 3SLS, respectively.
With respect to the home bias equations, we use cultural sites, female models and internet
users as instrumental variables for the attention allocated to each country. The results illus-
trate that U.S. investors have less home bias towards countries in which they allocate more
attention: a 10% increase in the number of click-throughs received by a country decreases home
bias by 0.27 or 0.30 percentage points, depending on whether the coe¢ cient is estimated by
2SLS or 3SLS, respectively.14 Both coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at the 5% level. There is also
less home bias from U.S. investors in countries with more sophisticated ￿nancial markets: a
1-point increase in market sophistication decreases home bias by 4.8 (2SLS estimator) or 3.5
(3SLS estimator) percentage points, with the coe¢ cient being signi￿cant at the 5% level. The
12In-sample ￿ts are better if home bias is not in natural logs. However, all results are qualitatively the same
regardless of whether natural logs are taken or not.
13Note that home bias is calculated as a percentage and that it is not included in the regressions in natural
logs. Therefore, when we state that US home bias towards a particular country, i.e. Spain, decreases by one
percentage point, we mean that Spain￿ s home bias decreases from 83.8% to 82.8%.
14Once again, home bias is calculated as a percentage and it is not included in the regressions in natural logs.
Hence, coe¢ cients refer to the estimated absolute percentage point change in home bias.
17number of procedures required to enforce a contract is only signi￿cant at the 5% level in the
3SLS estimation: for each additional procedure that is necessary to enforce a contract, there
is a 0.4 percentage point increase in the amount of home bias.
Overiden￿cation tests do not reject the validity of the chosen instruments in any procedure.
In other words, we cannot reject the orthogonality conditions assumed when estimating the
system either by 2SLS or 3SLS. The Hansen-Sargan statistics in result of the 2SLS method-
ology are 1.051 for the attention equation and 1.738 for the home bias equation with p-values
of 30.5% and 41.9%, respectively. Furthermore, the Hansen-Sargan statistic obtained by the
3SLS estimation is 2.545 with a p-value of 46.7%.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
One exercise helps us quantify the importance of attention allocation in explaining home
bias. We calculate counterfactual values of U.S. investors￿home bias towards all countries in
our sample under a ￿no home attention bias￿assumption. More speci￿cally, we assume that
all countries in our sample receive the exact same amount of attention that U.S. investors
allocate to their home country.15 Under this assumption and using the coe¢ cient estimated
by 3SLS, average U.S. home bias in our sample falls from 85.2% to 57.3%. There are also large
reductions in minimum and maximum home bias levels in our sample: maximum home bias
falls from 100% to 74.4% and minimum home bias from 26.5% to 5.9%. Figure 2 highlights
the di⁄erences between the inverse cumulative distributions of home bias in the actual data
and that in our simulation.
6.2 Robustness to Alternative Country Samples
We examine the robustness of our results with alternative country samples. As noted by
Ahearne et al (2004), U.S. holdings of foreign equities are unevenly distributed across countries.
U.S. investors concentrate a signi￿cant share of their foreign holdings on a handful of countries
and hold virtually no equities in a large number of countries. The ￿rst pair of equations in
Table 5 contain the estimation output of the baseline model with a subsample that excludes the
15In the AOL dataset, the attention level users allocated towards the US is 12,467,251.
18Top 5 countries, which at the end of 2006 constituted 48.17% of U.S. foreign equity holdings.
The Top 5 countries are the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Canada, and Switzerland. The
second pair of equations in Table 5 present the regression results of our baseline model after
eliminating ￿fteen countries within our sample towards which U.S. home bias is essentially
100%.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The results con￿rm that the signi￿cant two-way causality between attention and home
bias is not driven by either extremes of the U.S. holdings spectrum. All estimated coe¢ cients
reported in Table 5 are similar in magnitude and signi￿cance relative to those obtained with
the full sample. Moreover, the Hansen-Sargan statistics still fails to reject the validity of the
chosen instrument and the in-sample ￿ts remain high.
6.3 Robustness to Additional Control Variables
We also check the robustness of our results to country size, development level, gravity, and
return chasing. Omission of a control variable that simultaneously a⁄ects attention and home
bias would generate correlation between both variables that could be mistakenly interpreted
as causality. However, we ￿nd that evidence of a signi￿cant two-way causality between our
dependent variables is not a consequence of model misspeci￿cation.
The ￿rst pair of equations in Table 6 show that our results are not driven by country size.
In the attention equation, population and land area have coe¢ cients that are not statistically
signi￿cant. Moreover, country size has no e⁄ect on home bias either, as both variables also
render insigni￿cant coe¢ cients. This result is not surprising, since home bias is essentially a
linear transformation of U.S. holdings of foreign equities normalized by the size of a country￿ s
stock market. The second pair of equations in Table 6 suggest that a country￿ s economic
development level may a⁄ect home bias but not attention. In the attention equation, neither
the advanced economies dummy nor GDP per capita variable are statistically signi￿cant.
With respect to home bias, GDP per capita is not signi￿cant while advanced economies is
signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level. The statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on advanced
19economies implies that U.S. investors have on average 10.1 percentage points less home bias
against advanced economies.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The ￿rst pair of equations in Table 7 reveal that coe¢ cients associated to common language
and distance are not statistically signi￿cant. The cross-sectional variation in attention is most
likely already capturing informational asymmetries present in investment decisions. Moreover,
the second pair of equations in Table 7 show no evidence of return chasing behavior in our
dataset as the coe¢ cient associated to past stock market return is not signi￿cant.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Once again, we would like to highlight that our results are robust to additional controls
for size, economic development, gravity and return chasing. That is, all estimated coe¢ cients
presented in Tables 6 and 7 which are associated with variables from our baseline model
have similar values and signi￿cance relative to those presented in Table 4. Moreover, the
orthogonality condition assumed is not rejected by Hansen-Sargan statistics in any regression.
7 Conclusion
On August 3, 2006, AOL released a dataset which includes over 21 million web search queries
from 657,426 of its customers. The data includes all searches and results from users for a three
month period as well as a record regarding whether or not the user clicked on a search result.
Using the AOL dataset, we constructed a measure of cross-country attention allocation, given
by the number of times users clicked through a search result provided by a particular country.
We combine the click-through series with 2006 home bias data in the U.S.. Using an
instrumental variables approach, we ￿nd empirical evidence of two-way causality between
attention allocation and home bias. We use the number of World Heritage cultural sites, female
models popularity rank, and percentage of internet users in each country as instrumental
variables for attention allocation. Home bias is instrumented by the number of procedures
20required to enforce a contract and the level of ￿nancial market sophistication in a country. We
observe that our results are not driven by the handful of countries which receive almost half of
U.S. investment, nor by the large number of countries in which virtually no assets are held by
U.S. investors. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of additional variables that control
for size, economic development, gravity, and return chasing. We calculate counterfactual
values of U.S. investors￿home bias towards all countries in our sample under a ￿no home
attention bias￿ assumption. More speci￿cally, we assume that all countries in our sample
receive the exact same amount of attention that U.S. investors allocate to their home country.
Under this assumption and using the coe¢ cient estimated by 3SLS, average U.S. home bias
in our sample falls from 85.2% to 57.3%.
To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to measure attention allocation using internet
search engine tools data. This approach is intuitive for at least two reasons. First, the World
Wide Web is becoming a predominant information media. Second, search engines are the most
popular tool used in helping users ￿nd reliable information on the Web since it minimizes
the time required and the amount of information which must be consulted. In light of the
increasing popularity of the World Wide Web and search engines as well as our positive results
in this paper, we encourage the further use of search query data in the empirical analysis of
attention allocation theories.
References
[1] Ahearne, A., Griever, W., Warnock, F., 2004. Information Costs and Home Bias: An
Analysis of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Equities. Journal of International Economics 62,
313-336.
[2] Bacchetta, P., Van Wincoop, E., 2009. Infrequent Portfolio Decisions: A Solution to the
Forward Discount Puzzle. American Economic Review, forthcoming.
[3] Barron, J., Ni, J., 2008 .Endogenous Asymmetric Information and International Equity
Home Bias: The E⁄ects of Portfolio Size and Information Costs. Journal of International
Money and Finance 27, 617￿ 635.
[4] Beitzel, S., Jensen, E., Frieder, O., Grossman, D., Lewis, D., Chowdhury, A., Kolcz, A.,
2005. Automatic Web Query Classi￿cation Using Labeled and Unlabeled Training Data.
21Proceedings of the 28th annual international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and
development in information retrieval, 581-582.
[5] Beitzel, S., Jensen, E., Frieder, O., Lewis, D., Chowdhury, A., Kolcz, A., 2005. Improving
Automatic Query Classi￿cation Via Semi-supervised Learning. Proceedings of the Fifth
IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, 42-49.
[6] Bekaert, G., 1995. Market Integration and Investment Barriers in Emerging Equity Mar-
kets. World Bank Economic Review 9, 75￿ 107.
[7] Bohn, H., Tesar, L., 1996. U.S. Equity Investment in Foreign Markets: Portfolio Rebal-
ancing or Return Chasing?. American Economic Review 86, 77-81.
[8] Brennan, M., Cao, H., 1997. International portfolio ￿ ows. Journal of Finance 52, 1851-
1880.
[9] Chan, K., Covrig, V., Ng, L., 2005. What Determines the Domestic Bias and Foreign
Bias?. Journal of Finance 60, 1495-1534.
[10] Coval, J., Moskowitz, T., 2001. The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and
Asset Prices. Journal of Political Economy 109, 811-841.
[11] Dahlquist, M., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., Williamson R., 2003. Corporate Governance and
the Home Bias. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 87-110.
[12] Dahlquist, M., Robertsson, G., 2001. Direct Foreign Ownership, Institutional Investors,
and Firm Characteristics. Journal of Financial Economics 59, 413-440.
[13] Falkinger, J., 2007. Attention Economies. Journal of Economic Theory 133, 266-294.
[14] Fallows, D., 2005. Search Engine Users. Washington, DC: Pew Internet & American Life
Project.
[15] French, K., Poterba, J., 1991. Investor diversi￿cation and international equity markets.
American Economic Review 81, 222￿ 226.
[16] Gabaix, X., Laibson, D., 2002. The 6D Bias and the Equity Premium Puzzle. In B.
Bernanke, K. Rogo⁄ (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 257-312.
[17] Gehrig, T., 1993. An Information Based Explanation of the Domestic Bias in International
Equity Investment. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95, 97￿ 109.
[18] Hatchondo, J., 2008. Asymmetric Information and the Lack of International Portfolio
Diversi￿cation. International Economic Review 49, 1297-1330.
22[19] He, X., Yan, J., Ma, J., Liu, N., Chen, Z., 2007. Query Topic Detection for Reformulation.
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web, 1187-1188.
[20] Joachims, T., 2002. Optimizing Search Engines Using Clickthrough Data. Proceedings
of the eighth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data
mining, 133-142.
[21] Kang, J., Stulz, R., 1997. Why Is There a Home Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio
Equity Ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 46, 3-28.
[22] Kraay, A., Loayza, N., Serven, L., Ventura, J. 2005. Country Portfolios. Journal of the
European Economic Association 3, 914￿ 945.
[23] Lewandowski, D., 2006. Query Types and Search Topics of German Web Search Engine
Users. Information Services & Use 26, 261-269.
[24] Lenhart, A., Horrigan, J., Fallows, D., 2004. Content Creation Online. Washington, DC:
Pew Internet & American Life Project.
[25] Luo, Y., 2008. Consumption Dynamics under Information Processing Constraints. Review
of Economic Dynamics 11, 366-385.
[26] Mackoviak, B., Wiederholt, M., 2009a. Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention.
American Economic Review 99, 769-803.
[27] Mackowiak, B., Wiederholt, M., 2009b. Business Cycle Dynamics under Rational Inat-
tention. Working paper.
[28] Malloy, C., 2005. The Geography of Equity Analysis. Journal of Finance 60, 719-755.
[29] Mankiw, G., Reis, R., 2002. Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to
Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1295-
1328.
[30] Mondria, J., 2010. Portfolio Choice, Attention Allocation, and Price Comovement. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
[31] Mondria, J., Wu, T., 2010. The Puzzling Evolution of the Home Bias, Information
Processing and Financial Openness. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34, 875-
896.
[32] Pass, G., Chowdhury, A., Torgeson, C., 2006. A Picture of Search. Proceedings of the 1st
international conference on Scalable information systems.
23[33] Peng, L., Xiong, W., 2006. Investor Attention, Overcon￿dence and Category Learning.
Journal of Financial Economics 80, 563-602.
[34] Portes, R., Rey, H., 2005. The Determinants of Cross Border Equity Flows. Journal of
International Economics 65, 269-296.
[35] Sims, C., 2006. Rational Inattention: A Research Agenda. American Economic Review
96, 158-163.
[36] Tesar, L., Werner, I., 1995. Home bias and high turnover. Journal of International Money
and Finance 14, 467￿ 492.
[37] The Global Competitiveness Report, 2008. World Economic Forum.
[38] The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report, 2008. World Economic Forum.
[39] Tutino, A., 2009. The Rigidity of Choice . Lifecycle Savings with Information-Processing
Limits. Working paper.
[40] Van Nieuwerburgh, S., Veldkamp, L., 2009. Information Immobility and the Home Bias
Puzzle. Journal of Finance 64, 1187-1215.
[41] Van Nieuwerburgh, S., Veldkamp, L., 2010. Information Acquisition and Portfolio Under-
Diversi￿cation. Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
[42] Zhou, C., 1998. Dynamic portfolio choice and asset pricing with di⁄erential information.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 1027￿ 1051.
A Appendix
Table 8 presents the estimation output of the 2SLS ￿rst stage attention and home bias regres-
sions. There are a couple of features in these results that are worth commenting. First, we can
note that cultural sites, female models and internet users are highly signi￿cant in the atten-
tion equation. With respect to instruments for home bias, only market sophistication yields a
signi￿cant coe¢ cient. The coe¢ cient associated to enforce a contract, with a t-statistic of 1.35
and a p-value of 0.182, is not signi￿cant. However, we can also note that enforce a contract
is only signi￿cant in the 3SLS procedures.
The results also show that both enforce a contract and market sophistication are signi￿cant
in the attention equation. Most likely, both variables are capturing the strong e⁄ect of home
bias on attention allocation. The ￿rst stage coe¢ cients of both instruments is similar in
magnitude to their 2SLS second stage coe¢ cients in the home bias equation multiplied by the
2SLS home bias coe¢ cient in the attention equation. This is probably the same reason why
cultural sites is signi￿cant in the ￿rst stage 2SLS home bias equation.
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Figure 1: AOL Attention Allocation and International Investment 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
02468 1 0 1 2 1 4
US Holdings of Foreign Assets (million USD)
A
O
L
 
A
t
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
#
 
o
f
 
c
l
i
c
k
-
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
s
)
 
Note: both variables in natural logs.   26
Figure 2: Inverse Cumulative Distribution of Actual and Simulated Home Bias 
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Note: countries are ordered from smallest to largest home bias in the horizontal axis. Simulated home bias is calculated 
assuming that all countries in our sample receive the exact same amount of attention that US investors allocate to their 
home country and using the coefficient estimated by 3SLS in our baseline model (Table 4).   27
Table 1: Attention Allocation, Female Model Popularity Rank and Home Bias Statistics 
 
Attention Female Home Attention Female Home
Allocation Model Bias Allocation Model Bias
Argentina 4,690 0 94.2% Latvia 560 0 98.8%
Armenia 43 0 100.0% Lithuania 734 0 99.8%
Australia 60,103 228 76.7% Macedonia, FYR 74 0 100.0%
Austria 7,851 0 76.3% Malaysia 2,531 0 88.5%
Bangladesh 25 0 99.7% Mauritius 27 0 56.9%
Belgium 8,007 0 81.8% Mexico 3,987 208 39.2%
Bolivia 50 0 100.0% Mongolia 34 0 100.0%
Botswana 23 0 99.7% Morocco 95 0 98.3%
Brazil 4,918 412 67.6% Namibia 73 0 99.1%
Bulgaria 569 0 97.7% Nepal 36 0 100.0%
Canada 279,367 1,197 56.1% Netherlands 74,022 0 48.2%
Chile 1,514 0 93.6% New Zealand 8,677 71 74.0%
China 5,182 37 92.4% Norway 7,923 31 71.4%
Colombia 1,815 190 96.7% Pakistan 128 0 95.7%
Costa Rica 1,358 0 99.7% Paraguay 64 0 100.0%
Croatia 1,090 0 99.4% Peru 348 0 96.1%
Czech Republic 16,901 232 84.3% Philippines 1,978 0 77.9%
Denmark 12,505 0 77.0% Poland 8,073 40 87.6%
Ecuador 343 0 100.0% Portugal 9,157 0 85.6%
Egypt, Arab Rep. 562 0 88.3% Romania 5,335 0 97.2%
El Salvador 184 0 100.0% Russian Federation 16,241 194 90.5%
Estonia 1,070 0 97.4% Singapore 6,422 0 60.2%
Finland 11,185 0 47.3% Slovak Republic 2,243 0 100.0%
France 36,005 81 68.4% Slovenia 1,398 33 98.1%
Georgia 57 0 89.9% South Africa 5,860 298 86.1%
Germany 79,333 197 66.3% Spain 18,471 178 83.8%
Greece 1,986 0 82.6% Sri Lanka 71 0 95.1%
Hong Kong, China 8,415 0 76.0% Sweden 16,323 83 74.1%
Hungary 4,125 0 54.5% Switzerland 11,341 0 45.8%
Iceland 695 0 99.8% Tanzania 40 0 100.0%
India 4,122 54 85.3% Thailand 2,593 0 80.4%
Indonesia 328 0 79.3% Trinidad and Tobago 71 0 100.0%
Ireland 12,036 0 26.5% Tunisia 24 0 99.8%
Israel 5,401 200 62.4% Turkey 2,210 0 82.8%
Italy 23,782 95 77.4% Uganda 11 0 100.0%
Jamaica 39 0 100.0% Ukraine 2,683 54 98.6%
Japan 19,657 26 71.2% United Kingdom 311,326 1,195 55.5%
Jordan 83 0 99.8% Uruguay 172 0 100.0%
Kazakhstan 19 0 94.5% Venezuela, RB 353 0 70.5%
Kenya 99 0 99.8% Vietnam 299 0 100.0%
Korea, Rep. 7,830 22 65.8% Zambia 20 0 96.6%
Kyrgyz Republic 8 0 100.0% Zimbabwe 38 0 98.7%
Country Name Country Name
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Number of 
Observations
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
attention 84 13,636 1,665 46,511 8 311,326
home bias 84 85.2% 93.0% 17.4% 26.5% 100.0%
cultural sites 84 6.8 0 8.5 0 40
female models 84 64 4 195 0 1,197
internet users 84 32.1 24 25.1 0.3 85.9
market 
sophistication
84 4.7 5.0 1.2 2.6 6.8
enforce a 
contract
84 35 36 6 20 50
population 84 60,900,000 12,449,078 187,000,000 303,782 1,310,000,000
land area 84 1,077,422 291,780 2,621,963 699 17,100,000
GDP per capita 83 14,480 5,923 16,761 327 72,325
advanced 
economies
84 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
distance 84 5,461 4,905 2,230 456 10,187
stock market 
return
68 26.2% 18.7% 36.2% -39.2% 194.5%
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
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attention 100%
home bias -36% 100%
cultural sites 26% -21% 100%
female models 91% -31% 27% 100%
internet 36% -54% 15% 22% 100%
market 
sophistication
36% -61% 14% 32% 70% 100%
enforce a 
contract
-15% 37% 17% -2% -52% -44% 100%
population -3% 6% 39% 1% -25% -12% 26% 100%
land area 24% -2% 19% 39% -11% -4% 17% 41% 100%
GDP per capita 38% -65% 23% 24% 86% 73% -51% -20% -8% 100%
advanced 
economies
38% -62% 32% 25% 77% 71% -44% -16% -9% 88% 100%
distance -28% 16% -27% -29% -29% -9% 0% 18% -3% -30% -15% 100%
stock market 
return
-10% 19% -12% 0% -26% -28% 26% -3% 18% -25% -25% -2% 100%
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Table 4: Baseline Model Estimation Output 
 
(4.1) (4.2)
Estimation method: 2SLS 2SLS
Variables: attention home bias attention home bias
attention - -0.027*** - -0.030***
- (0.010) - (0.009)
home bias -9.975*** - -11.22*** -
(2.232) - (2.149) -
cultural sites 0.437** - 0.549*** -
(0.207) - (0.178) -
female models 0.246*** - 0.200*** -
(0.093) - (0.061) -
internet users 0.620*** - 0.467*** -
(0.153) - (0.139) -
enforce a contract - 0.002 - 0.004**
- (0.003) - (0.002)
market sophistication - -0.048** - -0.035**
- (0.020) - (0.016)
Overidentification test
Hansen-Sargan statistic 1.051 1.738
(0.305) (0.419)
Number of observations 84 84
R
2
65.9% 48.2% 60.2% 47.5%
Note: Equations (4.1) and (4.2) were estimated individually by two stages least squares with
White's robust standard errors. The system of equations (4.3) was jointly estimated by three stages
least squares. Standard errors are given in parenthesis under the coefficients, and the p-value is
given in parenthesis under the Hansen-Sargan statistic. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the
individual coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
The following variables are in natural logs: attention, internet users, (one plus) cultural sites and
(one plus) female models.
84
(4.3)
3SLS
2.545
(0.467)
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Table 5: Baseline Model with Alternative Country Samples 
 
Estimation method:
Variables: attention home bias attention home bias
attention - -0.030*** - -0.029***
- (0.010) - (0.011)
home bias -12.41*** - -9.832*** -
(2.448) - (2.272) -
cultural sites 0.559*** - 0.534*** -
(0.200) - (0.185) -
female models 0.165*** - 0.224*** -
(0.063) - (0.065) -
internet users 0.433*** - 0.552*** -
(0.140) - (0.172) -
enforce a contract - 0.004** - 0.005*
- (0.002) - (0.002)
market sophistication - -0.028* - -0.040**
- (0.016) - (0.019)
Overidentification test
Hansen-Sargan statistic
Sample
Number of observations
R
2
46.5% 40.8% 57.1% 41.4%
Note: Each pair of equations were estimated simultaneously by three stages least squares. Standard
errors are given in parenthesis under the coefficients, and the p-value is given in parenthesis under
the Hansen-Sargan statistic. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the individual coefficient is
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The following variables are in
natural logs: attention, internet users, (one plus) cultural sites and (one plus) female models.
(0.442)
69
excludes Top 5 countries
US equity investment
which attract the most
excludes countries with
less than $500,000 of
US equity investment
(0.530)
79
(5.1) (5.2)
3SLS
2.691
3SLS
2.212
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Table 6: Robustness Checks – Country Size and Development Level 
 
Estimation method:
Variables: attention home bias attention home bias
attention - -0.026** - -0.025**
- (0.012) - (0.011)
home bias -10.83*** - -12.55** -
(2.569) - (5.054) -
cultural sites 0.314* - 0.538*** -
(0.165) - (0.200) -
female models 0.160*** - 0.200*** -
(0.062) - (0.068) -
internet users 0.699*** - 0.402** -
(0.196) - (0.180) -
enforce a contract - 0.005** - 0.003*
- (0.002) - (0.002)
market sophistication - -0.037** - -0.025
- (0.019) - (0.018)
population 0.161 -0.019 - -
(0.158) (0.013) - -
land area 0.084 0.010 - -
(0.125) (0.009) - -
advanced economies - - -0.973 -0.101**
- - (0.917) (0.049)
GDP per capita - - 0.185 0.009
- - (0.323) (0.020)
Overidentification test
Hansen-Sargan statistic
Number of observations
R
2
63.6% 48.9% 53.8% 50.0%
Note: Each pair of equations were estimated simultaneously by three stages least squares. Standard
errors are given in parenthesis under the coefficients, and the p-value is given in parenthesis under
the Hansen-Sargan statistic. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the individual coefficient is
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The following variables are in
natural logs: attention, internet users, population, land area,GDP per capita,(one plus) cultural sites
and (one plus) female models.
84 83
(6.1) (6.2)
3SLS 3SLS
1.831 2.256
(0.608) (0.521)
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Table 7: Robustness Checks – Gravity and Return Chasing 
 
Estimation method:
Variables: attention home bias attention home bias
attention - -0.034*** - -0.027**
- (0.010) - (0.012)
home bias -12.99*** - -8.014*** -
(2.730) - (2.203) -
cultural sites 0.431* - 0.478*** -
(0.230) - (0.172) -
female models 0.182*** - 0.243*** -
(0.062) - (0.065) -
internet users 0.360** - 0.656*** -
(0.159) - (0.180) -
enforce a contract - 0.003* - 0.005*
- (0.002) - (0.003)
market sophistication - -0.027 - -0.050**
- (0.017) - (0.020)
common language -0.748 -0.045 - -
(0.520) (0.035) - -
distance 0.083 0.004 - -
(0.387) (0.029) - -
stock market return - - -0.425 0.011
- - (0.733) (0.070)
Overidentification test
Hansen-Sargan statistic
Number of observations
R
2
52.5% 48.3% 62.4% 43.0%
Note: Each pair of equations were estimated simultaneously by three stages least squares. Standard
errors are given in parenthesis under the coefficients, and the p-value is given in parenthesis under
the Hansen-Sargan statistic. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the individual coefficient is
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The following variables are in
natural logs: attention, internet users, distance, (one plus) cultural sites, (one plus) female models
and (one plus) stock market return.
84 68
2.363 1.935
(0.501) (0.586)
(7.1) (7.2)
3SLS 3SLS
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Table 8: Baseline Model 2SLS First Stage Estimation Output 
 
(8.1) (8.2)
Estimation method: OLS OLS
Variables: attention home bias
cultural sites 0.880*** -0.038**
(0.173) (0.016)
female models 0.296*** -0.005
(0.059) (0.009)
internet users 0.671*** -0.006
(0.154) (0.014)
enforce a contract -0.084*** 0.005
(0.024) (0.004)
market sophistication 0.544*** -0.068***
(0.132) (0.016)
Number of observations 84 84
R
2
81.8% 46.7%
Note: Each equation was estimated individually by ordinary least
squares. White's robust standard errors are given in parenthesis
under the coefficients. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the
individual coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance level, respectively. The following variables are in
natural logs: attention, internet users, (one plus) cultural sites and
(one plus) female models.  